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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1974, Justice Byron White stated in Wolff v. McDonnell, “There is 
no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this 
country.”1  In 1979, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that such a 
curtain could be drawn between Fourteenth Amendment due process and a 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2014; B.A., University of 
Michigan, 2010. 
1 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974). 
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prisoner’s discretionary parole release hearing.2  For roughly the past three 
decades, the Court’s decision in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska 
Penal and Correctional Complex has given state parole boards unbridled 
discretion to release or reject inmates that seek grants of discretionary 
parole release.3  It has even permitted some states, such as Alabama, to 
exclude inmates from their hearings altogether. 
The actual costs of excluding inmates in this fashion remains 
unknown. But in a recent study involving Israeli judges, researchers 
concluded that judicial rulings—and in the case of the study, parole 
decisions—can be greatly influenced by external factors such as how 
recently a judge took a break to eat.4  Remarkably, the study showed that 
the percentage of favorable rulings drops gradually from roughly 65% to 
nearly zero within each decision session and returns abruptly to roughly 
65% after a break.5  These findings raise intriguing questions about the 
factors that affect parole decisions across the globe. 
In the United States, “[p]arole is a period of conditional supervised 
release in the community following a prison term.”6  Unlike in Israel, where 
parole decisions are made by judges, panels of Americans appointed to 
administrative agencies, such as state parole boards, make parole release 
decisions.7  U.S. parole board members do not necessarily have any legal 
training.8 
Perhaps the most critical determination made by a parole board is the 
likelihood that an inmate will reoffend if released, or in other words, how 
significantly his criminal ways have been rehabilitated.9  In order to conduct 
this recidivism analysis during the discretionary parole release process, a 
long list of states, including Missouri, Texas, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, 
Montana, and Illinois, provide an inmate with the opportunity to appear 
before at least one member of a parole board in a hearing or an interview.10 
 
2 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). 
3 See id. (holding that the possibility of parole release does not warrant Fourteenth 
Amendment due process protection). 
4 See Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 6889, 6889 (2011). 
5 See id. 
6 LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & ERIKA PARKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at 2 (2012). 
7 See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 
87 (2003). 
8 See id. 
9 See Dan Bernhardt et al., Rehabilitated or Not: An Informational Theory of Parole 
Decisions, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 186, 187 (2012). 
10 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 217.690(2) (West 2004) (“[T]he board shall have the 
offender appear before a hearing panel and shall conduct a personal interview with him, unless 
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Not every state parole board, however, permits inmates to speak on 
their own behalf at parole release hearings.  In fact, policies employed by 
some state parole boards, such as the Alabama Board of Pardons and 
Paroles (the Board), make this geographically impossible.  Specifically, the 
Board currently holds all parole hearings in Montgomery, Alabama,11  yet 
an inmate could be incarcerated hours away from Montgomery by car.  
Therefore, to attend his hearing in person, the inmate would need to be 
transferred to Montgomery by the Alabama Department of Corrections 
(DOC).  Responding to a request for information about Board policies filed 
under Alabama’s open records law, Board representatives maintained that 
“[t]o transport inmates to the Board for their parole hearing would create an 
added financial responsibility for the Department of Corrections.”12  While 
Board representatives insist that there is no formal policy concerning 
inmates’ hearing attendance,13 the system is structured so that there may be 
no other practical effect than to exclude the inmates from the very process 
that could secure their freedom.14  
 
waived by the offender.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.141(c) (West 2012) (“Before 
releasing an inmate on parole, a parole panel may have the inmate appear before the panel and 
interview the inmate.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-411(B) (2002) (West) (“A prisoner who is 
eligible for parole or absolute discharge from imprisonment shall be given an opportunity to be 
heard either before a hearing officer designated by the board or the board itself, at the discretion 
of the board.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-3(i)(3) (West 2004) (“[T]he person being considered 
may appear, speak in the person’s own behalf, and present documentary evidence.”); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-3717(j)(1) (West 2007) (“Before ordering the parole of any inmate, the 
prisoner review board shall have the inmate appear either in person or via a video conferencing 
format and shall interview the inmate unless impractical because of the inmate’s physical or 
mental condition or absence from the institution.”); Newbury v. Prisoner Review Bd., 791 F.2d 
81, 87 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding the Due Process Clause satisfied where an inmate appeared 
before a single member of the Illinois state parole board); Sage v. Gamble, 929 P.2d 822, 827 
(Mont. 1996) (finding a due process violation where the Montana state parole board prevented 
an inmate from appearing at his parole hearing). 
11 See E-mail from Ala. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles to author (Oct. 31, 2012, 04:20 CST) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter October 2012 Board E-mail]. 
12 Letter from Eddie Cook, Jr., Assistant Exec. Dir., Ala. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, to 
author (July 17, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter July 2013 Board Letter]; see also 
October 2012 Board E-mail, supra note 11.  This correspondence indicated that parole 
hearings were previously held at each Alabama correctional facility, which allowed the 
inmates to easily access the hearings.  See E-mail from Ala. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles to 
author (Nov. 2, 2012, 11:50 CST) (on file with author) [hereinafter November 2012 Board 
E-mail].  Reportedly, no one then employed by the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles 
remembered when the practice of holding hearings in Montgomery began.  Id. 
13 See October 2012 Board E-mail, supra note 11. 
14 One also questions the contention that there is no formal policy regarding inmates’ 
attendance when Board representatives have also noted that “[i]nmates that are on work 
release and are able to attend their hearings are prohibited by Department of Correction[s] 
rules.”  July 2013 Board Letter, supra note 12.  
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Regardless of the formality of the policy, however, it is quite clear 
that, “[i]n Alabama, inmates do not attend parole hearings.”15  This 
Comment contends that this practice violates Fourteenth Amendment 
procedural due process.  In so arguing, this Comment seeks to reject the 
reasoning underlying the U.S. Supreme Court case of Greenholtz, which 
held that Fourteenth Amendment due process does not apply to parole 
release hearings.16 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE OF PAROLE RELEASE DECISIONS 
Since the nineteenth century, parole release has been an integral part of 
our criminal justice system.  Today, it is still part of an ongoing dialogue 
concerning the release and rehabilitation of the offender population. The 
earliest example of parole in this country was a program implemented in 
1876 at a youth facility in New York.17  New York formally adopted a 
parole system in 1907 and was the first state to do so.18  All states and the 
federal government had a parole system in place by 1942.19 
State and federal parole systems have created two distinct categories of 
parole release: discretionary and mandatory parole.  Discretionary parole 
consists of indeterminate sentences, a specific system for granting release, 
and post-release supervision.20  Mandatory parole, on the other hand, can be 
described as “a matter of bookkeeping: one calculates the amount of time 
served plus good time and subtracts it from the prison sentence imposed.”21 
In other words, once an inmate has served a certain amount of his sentence, 
parole release is mandatory by state law. 
Time spent on parole release is vastly different from time spent in a 
correctional facility—the obvious difference being that a parolee is not 
confined within prison walls.  Nonetheless, the life of a parolee is far 
different from that of an ordinary citizen.  Once released on parole, inmates 
are placed under supervision for a period of one to three years in most 
states, although parole supervision can be as long as ten to twenty years in 
some states, such as Texas.22  This supervision typically consists of check-
 
15 Id. 
16 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). 
17 See PETERSILIA, supra note 7, at 58. 
18 See id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 59. 
22 See id.; COMM. ON CMTY. SUPERVISION & DESISTANCE FROM CRIME, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PAROLE, DESISTANCE FROM CRIME, AND COMMUNITY 
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ins as well as field contacts by parole agents,23 whose responsibilities 
include “drug testing, monitoring curfews, and collecting restitution.”24 
Despite the fact that serving time on parole still requires individuals to 
abide by strict guidelines, discretionary parole remains controversial.  Many 
feel that discretionary parole release permits unnecessary leniency for 
convicted criminals and contributes to high recidivism rates.25  Others argue 
that abolishing discretionary parole will lead to “greater honesty in 
sentencing decisions.”26  In fact, many states and the federal government 
abolished discretionary parole.27 
Even though discretionary parole release has fallen out of favor with 
many states and the federal government, it is far from irrelevant.  For 
example, the Supreme Court recently held in Miller v. Alabama that state 
sentencing laws could no longer dictate mandatory life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole for individuals who were under the age of 
eighteen when they committed their crimes.28  This decision is important 
not only because it demonstrates that parole release is still relevant, but also 
because it highlights the inescapable connection between an inmate’s 
sentence and his possibility of obtaining discretionary parole.29  As this 
Comment discusses in Part III, this connection strengthens the justification 
for providing greater constitutional protection to the parole release process. 
In addition, state parole systems unquestionably affect a large number 
of individuals across the United States.  In 2009, 5,018,900 individuals 
were supervised on either parole or probation.30  In 2011, roughly 1.1 
million people moved through the parole system while “the state parole 
population increased by 1.1%.”31  Given these statistics, questions of when 
to incarcerate, when to release, and how to rehabilitate the offender 
population are critical. 
In fact, many states and the federal government have recently allocated 
additional resources to rehabilitate criminal offenders.  For example, several 
 
INTEGRATION 9 (2007) [hereinafter DESISTANCE FROM CRIME]. 
23 See DESISTANCE FROM CRIME, supra note 22, at 33. 
24 PETERSILIA, supra note 7, at 88. 
25 See id. at 158. 
26 Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 
479, 480 (1999). 
27 See id. 
28 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
29 This Comment will discuss how this connection strengthens the justification for 
providing greater constitutional protection to the parole release process in Part III. 
30 LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 3 tbl.1 (2011). 
31 MARUSCHAK & PARKS, supra note 6, at 1, 7. 
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states, including New York, Maryland, and Michigan, have created special 
committees, task forces, or initiatives designed to deal specifically with 
prisoner reentry.32  Additionally, many states now have formal reentry 
programs run by both state and federal courts in which voluntary 
participants are able to seek help and guidance in the process of 
reintegrating into society after incarceration.33 
The process of rehabilitating an offender, however, sometimes begins 
with a determination that he is ready to be released into society through the 
vehicle of parole release.  The underpinnings of the release process, 
therefore, deserve attention—particularly in states such as Alabama where 
the Board has absolute discretion to either grant or deny an inmate’s parole 
at the conclusion of a parole release hearing. 
B. CURRENT PRACTICES OF THE ALABAMA BOARD OF PARDONS AND 
PAROLES 
In light of recent concerns regarding the size of the offender 
population,34 one might expect state parole boards to be more amenable to 
granting discretionary parole in an effort to reduce the number of 
incarcerated individuals.  This has not been the case, however, in Alabama.  
According to annual reports released by the Board each fiscal year, the 
denial rate has increased from 56.6% in 2007–200835 to 58.6% in 2008–
2009,36 and from 60.4% in 2009–201037 to 69.5% in 2010–2011.38  This 
statistic rose even higher in the 2011–2012 report, which disclosed that 
70.6% of inmates were denied parole in the that fiscal year.39 
 
32 See Randy E. Davidson, Resources on Collateral Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions, MICH. B.J. 52, 52 (2008); Hon. Susan K. Gauvey & Katerina M. Georgiev, 
Reform in Ex-offender Reentry: Building Bridges and Shattering Silos, MD. B.J. 14, 16 
(2011); Seymour W. James, Jr., A Fair Chance, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N. J. 5, 5 (2012). 
33 See Hon. Joan Gottschall & Molly Armour, Second Chance: Establishing a Reentry 
Program in the Northern District of Illinois, 5 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 31, 35, 43 (2011). 
34 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (upholding the decision of a three-
judge panel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to enter 
a prisoner release order aimed at reducing the California prison population in light of Eighth 
Amendment violations). 
35 ALA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, FISCAL 2007–2008 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (4,163 
paroles denied of 7,356 considered). 
36 ALA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL 2008–2009, at 34 (4,644 
paroles denied of 7,924 considered). 
37 ALA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL 2009–2010, at 27 (4,098 
paroles denied of 6,788 considered). 
38 ALA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL 2010–2011, at 28 (4,774 
paroles denied of 6,871 considered). 
39 ALA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL 2011–2012, at 30 (5,228 
paroles denied of 7,406 considered) [hereinafter 2011–2012 REPORT]. 
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The Alabama statistics confirm a nationwide trend.  Since the late 
1970s, the percentage of inmates released on discretionary parole in the 
United States has declined steadily from 72% in 1977 to just 24% in 1999.40  
Yet as states like Alabama continue to provide for discretionary parole but 
deny it to the vast majority of inmates, a closer look at discretionary parole 
is warranted. 
Under current state law, the Alabama governor has the power to 
appoint members to the Board, while the state senate must approve his 
selections.41  These Board positions are full-time and are compensated by 
the state; members are appointed for six-year terms.42  An Alabama inmate 
is not eligible for parole consideration until he has served either one-third or 
ten years of his sentence, whichever is lesser.43  The Board releases inmates 
on parole, “only if . . . there is reasonable probability that . . . he will live 
and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not 
incompatible with the welfare of society.”44 
The Board has the power to create additional rules, so long as those 
rules do not infringe on certain rights: 
The Board of Pardons and Paroles may adopt and promulgate rules and regulations, 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this article . . . provided . . .  that no rule or 
regulation adopted and promulgated by such board shall have the effect of denying to 
any person whose application for parole . . .  is being considered by said  board from 
having the benefit of counsel or witnesses upon said hearing.45 
Interestingly, the Alabama statute protects an inmate’s right to have 
counsel and witnesses at his parole hearing but does not protect the right of 
the inmate to be present at the hearing.46  Aside from requiring notice and 
specifying the standard under which an inmate may be released, Alabama 
law does not provide any other express rights, privileges, or protections for 
the inmates who face the parole release process.47 
The lack of protection for inmates’ rights in the parole release process 
under Alabama law is worth comparing to the protections afforded to 
victims during this same process.  For example, depending on the nature of 
the offender’s conviction, some victims or their family members have an 
absolute right to thirty days’ notice prior to an inmate’s hearing, as well as a 
 
40 PETERSILIA, supra note 7, at 88. 
41 See ALA. CODE § 15-22-20(b) (LexisNexis 1975). 
42 Id. § 15-22-20(c), (g)-(h). 
43 Id. § 15-22-28(e). 
44 Id. § 15-22-26. 
45 Id. § 15-22-37 (emphasis added). 
46 See generally id. §§ 15–22. 
47 See id. 
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right to “present his or her views to the board in person or in writing.”48  
While inmates enjoy a similar right to notice,49 any right to present their 
views to the Board is severely limited, if not barred altogether, by the fact 
that they cannot attend their own hearings.50 
The choice to protect the rights of victims over the rights of inmates in 
the discretionary parole release process admittedly seems justified.51  After 
all, victims of crimes are likely to be affected by the incarceration or release 
of individuals who committed offenses against them or their loved ones.52  
Nonetheless, an inmate himself has a tremendous amount at stake at a 
release hearing as well—namely, his freedom from incarceration.  
Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted that “though his rights may be 
diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a 
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is 
imprisoned for a crime.”53  In other words, “[t]here is no iron curtain drawn 
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.”54  Among many 
other rights, inmates have the rights to receive medical care and to be 
housed in conditions consistent with the Eighth Amendment,55 the right to 
substantial religious freedoms,56 the right not to be discriminated against 
under the Equal Protection Clause,57 and the right not to be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.58  Simply because an 
individual is housed in a correctional facility does not prevent the 
Constitution from governing how that individual is treated by our judicial 
and administrative systems, which have the potential to significantly impact 
 
48 Id. § 15-22-36(e)(1), (3)(i). 
49 See id. § 15-22-36(d). 
50 Additionally, Board representatives claim that allowing inmates to attend their 
hearings “could create a security issue for the Board,” because victims could potentially be 
in the same room as the inmate and the inmate’s family.  See July 2013 Board Letter, supra 
note 12.  This argument emphasizes the clear choice Alabama has made to protect the rights 
of victims at the expense of the rights of inmates. 
51 But see Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim Input at 
Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME & JUST. 347, 347 (2009) (finding that victim input during 
the parole process is inconsistent with sound correctional principles or principles of 
fundamental justice). 
52 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 11 (1982). 
53 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974). 
54 Id. at 555–56 
55 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). 
56 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 
546, 546 (1964) (per curiam). 
57 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506–07 (2005). 
58 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486–87 (1995) (suggesting that a prison regulation can 
create a protectable liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment if it imposes an atypical and 
significant hardship on the inmate); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 117 (1945). 
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his life, liberty, and property.  And the possibility of parole release—i.e., 
freedom from incarceration—certainly implicates inmates’ liberty in an 
important way. 
Nevertheless, Alabama law permits—and the practices of the Board 
create and enforce—a system of inmate exclusion from the discretionary 
parole release process.59  This system excludes inmates from the Board’s 
decisionmaking process, which potentially gives the Board greater 
flexibility to make the kind of arbitrary determinations about the inmate’s 
freedom that were exposed in the Israeli research study.60  Additionally, 
recent research shows that the particular manner in which inmates 
communicate with a parole board may affect the outcome of their 
hearings.61  Given that Alabama’s policy deviates from policies employed 
by other states,62 and given that the Board is increasingly reluctant to grant 
parole to inmates63 at a time when concerns about the prison population are 
paramount, this policy of inmate exclusion from parole release hearings 
merits close examination. 
C. THE CONTEXT OF GREENHOLTZ: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
DEFINING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS IN PAROLE RELEASE 
AND REVOCATION 
 The extent to which a liberty interest exists during a parole release 
determination is governed by the 1979 U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Greenholtz.64  Furthermore, the holding in Greenholtz is best understood in 
the context of the Court’s decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer in 1972 and 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli in 1973—both of which addressed the constitutional 
protection of the parole revocation process.65 
 
59 See ALA. CODE § 15-22-23 (LexisNexis 1975) (providing no right for an inmate to 
appear in person at his or her parole release hearing).  See also 2011–2012 REPORT, supra 
note 39, at 23–26 (detailing the Board’s policies regarding hearings and providing no express 
right of the inmate to appear in person); October 2012 Board E-mail, supra note 11 
(indicating that it is practically impossible for inmates to attend their hearings). 
60 See Danziger, supra note 4. 
61 See Richard Tewksbury & David Patrick Connor, Predicting the Outcome of Parole 
Hearings, CORRECTIONS TODAY, June/July 2012, at 54, 56. 
62 See the authorities and accompanying text in supra note 10. 
63 See supra notes 35–39. 
64 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).  The term 
“liberty interest” is used to refer to the rights conferred on an individual by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses.  See Legal Information Institute, Cornell University 
Law School, http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/liberty_interest (last visited Aug. 20, 2013). 
65 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972).  Parole revocation is the process by which an inmate is accused of violating his 
parole, and a decisionmaking entity determines whether the parolee’s release should be 
1210 ERIN LANGE RAMAMURTHY [Vol. 103 
The Court’s holding in Greenholtz was twofold.  First, the Court held 
that inmates do not enjoy a constitutionally conferred liberty interest at a 
parole release hearing merely because a state has provided for “the 
possibility of parole.”66  In other words, the Constitution does not confer 
Fourteenth Amendment due process protection on parole release 
proceedings.67  Second, the Court held that although the Constitution does 
not confer a liberty interest at an inmate’s parole release hearing, such an 
interest might be conferred by state statute, depending on the statute’s 
wording.68 
Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Greenholtz at a time 
when approval of discretionary parole was in a general decline.  Indeed, as 
research suggests, “some states began to question the very foundation of 
parole.”69  This sentiment surfaced after decades in which the percentage of 
inmates released on discretionary parole steadily increased from 44% in 
1940 to 72% in 1977.70  These statistics arose amidst the backdrop of a 
nation prepared to be tough on crime,71 as Richard Nixon’s 1968 
presidential campaign had promised.  Therefore, the Greenholtz decision 
and its limiting effect on the rights of inmates during discretionary parole 
release perhaps demonstrates the Supreme Court’s sensitivity to relevant 
social pressures. 
1. Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Greenholtz is best understood by 
examining the Court’s holdings in Morrissey and Gagnon.  In Morrissey, 
the Court considered whether a liberty interest, and therefore due process 
protection, extended to a parole revocation hearing.72  The Court in Gagnon 




revoked, in which case the inmate would spend the rest of his sentence in prison.  
PETERSILIA, supra note 7, at 87. 
66 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 12. 
69 PETERSILIA, supra note 7, at 59. 
70 Id. at 58.  The percentage of inmates released on discretionary parole has been in 
steady decline since 1977.  See id. 
71 See Marc Mauer, Why Are Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, 11 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 9, 13 (1999) (noting that Richard Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign solidified 
the law and order movement on a national scale). 
72 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
73 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 (1973). 
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In Morrissey, the petitioner was an Iowa inmate released on 
discretionary parole in June 1968.74  Seven months after his release, the 
petitioner’s parole was revoked without a formal hearing.75  He challenged 
his parole revocation in a federal habeas petition, alleging that the lack of a 
formal revocation hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process 
rights.76  The Supreme Court held that there is a conditional liberty interest 
present at a parole revocation hearing.77  While the Court characterized the 
interest at revocation as “conditional,”78 it still concluded that some amount 
of due process protection was warranted: 
We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many 
of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ 
on the parolee and often on others.  It is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with 
this problem in terms of whether the parolee’s liberty is a ‘right’ or a ‘privilege.’  By 
whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly process, however 
informal.79 
In addition to the constitutional protection given to parole in 
Morrissey, the Supreme Court in Gagnon gave further constitutional 
protection to parolees during the revocation process.  The Gagnon Court 
considered whether the lack of legal counsel during the probation 
revocation process violated due process.80  As in Morrissey, the Court 
considered the issue in the context of a federal habeas petition contesting 
the legality of an inmate’s detention on the grounds that the inmate was not 
given a probation revocation hearing or the benefit of legal counsel.81  The 
Court concluded that, consistent with Morrissey, the denial of a probation 
revocation hearing was a denial of due process.82  On the question of 
whether legal counsel was necessary during the revocation process, the 
Court declined to create a blanket rule establishing a right to legal counsel 
at a revocation hearing.83  However, the Court noted that while legal 
counsel was not necessary at every parole or probation revocation 
proceeding, “there will remain certain cases in which fundamental 
fairness—the touchstone of due process—will require that the State provide 
 
74 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 472. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 474. 
77 See id. at 482. 
78 Id. at 480. 
79 Id. at 482. 
80 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973). 
81 See id. at 779–80. 
82 See id. at 782. 
83 Id. at 790. 
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at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees.”84  In other 
words, the Court determined that the question of whether states must 
provide counsel to individuals facing parole or probation revocation is 
answered on a “case-by-case” basis.85  Nonetheless, the Gagnon holding 
recognizes that situations exist in which prisoners have the right to counsel 
during parole revocation, which supplements the constitutional protection 
of parole revocation in addition to the recognition of a due process right. 
While the combination of Morrissey and Gagnon do not amount to full 
due process protection of parole revocation proceedings, the constitutional 
protections provided at those proceedings far surpass those afforded during 
parole release.  The Court announced this constitutionally significant 
distinction between parole revocation and parole release in Greenholtz 
when it held that parole release is not protected by Fourteenth Amendment 
due process.86 
2. Greenholtz 
In Greenholtz, Nebraska inmates filed a § 1983 class action lawsuit in 
federal court against the individual members of the Board of Parole, 
alleging the unconstitutional denial of their parole.87  Among other claims, 
the inmates alleged that the Nebraska parole statutes and the Board’s 
policies failed to uphold procedural due process.88  The United States 
District Court for the District of Nebraska held that the same “conditional 
liberty interest” present at the parole revocation process that the Court 
recognized in Morrissey was also present in Greenholtz with respect to 
discretionary parole release.89  The district court also suggested procedures 
which, in the court’s opinion, satisfied this due process protection.90  The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding, 
although it made changes to the district court’s suggested procedures.91 
In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit decision relating to the existence 
of a constitutionally conferred liberty interest at parole release.92  Justices 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 788. 
86 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). 
87 See id. at 3–4. 
88 See id. at 4. 
89 See id. at 5. 
90 See Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274, 1282–
83 (8th Cir. 1978) (quoting the district court). 
91 See id. at 1285. 
92 See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. 
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Lewis Powell, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, and John Paul 
Stevens dissented on this point.93 
Despite the Supreme Court’s due process holding, in the second prong 
of its analysis, the Court nevertheless found that the Nebraska statute at 
issue did confer a liberty interest—and therefore due process protections—
on the parole release process by the nature of the statute’s wording.94  The 
Nebraska statute at issue in Greenholtz read: 
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is 
eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that 
his release should be deferred because: 
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole; 
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect 
for the law; 
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; 
or 
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other 
training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-
abiding life when released at a later date.95 
The inmates in Greenholtz argued that the structure of the statute, as 
well as the use of the word “shall,” created a “presumption” or “legitimate 
expectation” of parole release, and therefore the inmates’ releases were 
subject to due process constraints.96  The Court agreed.97  Nevertheless, the 
Court found that the particular policies challenged by the Nebraska inmates 
satisfied due process requirements.98  Specifically, the Court noted: 
At the Board’s initial interview hearing, the inmate is permitted to appear before the 
Board and present letters and statements on his own behalf.  He is thereby provided with 
an effective opportunity first, to insure that the records before the Board are in fact the 
records relating to his case; and second, to present any special considerations 
demonstrating why he is an appropriate candidate for parole.  Since the decision is one 
that must be made largely on the basis of the inmate’s files, this procedure adequately 
safeguards against serious risks of error and thus satisfies due process.99 
It is noteworthy that the Greenholtz Court specifically cited the 
inmate’s ability to appear before the parole board as a reason for holding 
 
93 See id. at 18–22 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 22–41 
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part). 
94 See id. at 15–16. 
95 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 83-1, 114(1) (West 1976). 
96 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11–12. 
97 See id. at 15–16. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 15. 
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that the parole procedures satisfied the statutory due process right.  Such an 
acknowledgment presents interesting questions about whether the Alabama 
policy of inmate exclusion would pass constitutional muster if the Court 
were to overturn Greenholtz and hold that a Fourteenth Amendment due 
process right does exist during parole release. 
The task of demonstrating that Greenholtz should indeed be overturned 
involves highlighting the pitfalls of the majority’s opinion.  The dissenting 
opinions in Greenholtz certainly achieve this feat.  On the question of 
whether the Constitution afforded the parole release process inherent due 
process protections, Justices Powell, Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens 
dissented.100  In a separate opinion, Justice Powell noted, “A substantial 
liberty from legal restraint is at stake when the State makes decisions 
regarding parole or probation.”101  He further argued that this liberty interest 
should be protected under the Constitution if and when a state provides for 
discretionary parole.102  He reasoned that “[n]othing in the Constitution 
requires a State to provide for probation or parole.  But when a State adopts 
a parole system that applies general standards of eligibility, prisoners 
justifiably expect that parole will be granted fairly and according to law 
whenever those standards are met.”103   
Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion centered on the majority’s 
departure from Morrissey, which extended some due process protections to 
the parole revocation process.104  As Justice Marshall’s dissent highlighted, 
the Greenholtz Court broke with previous precedent regarding parole 
revocation in finding that due process protection did not extend to parole 
release decisions.105   
III. DISCUSSION 
This Comment challenges the holding of Greenholtz, and in turn, the 
exclusionary policy of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles in three 
ways.  First, Part III.A asserts that the first prong of Greenholtz was 
incorrectly decided due to the Court’s failure to recognize the similarities 
between parole release and parole revocation decisions, as well as the 
Court’s flawed contention that a parole release decision is dissimilar from a 
judicial decision.  Second, Part III.B argues that the reasoning adopted in 
 
100 See id. at 18–22 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 22–41 
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part). 
101 Id. at 18. 
102 See id. at 19. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. at 22 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). 
105 Id. at 11. 
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the second prong of Greenholtz—which allows due process protection of 
parole release only when conferred by statute—has been eroded by the 
Court’s recent holding in Sandin v. Conner.  Finally, Part III.C concludes 
by arguing that assuming a constitutional due process right does exist 
during parole release, the Alabama practice of excluding inmates from their 
hearings violates due process. 
A. THE FIRST PRONG OF GREENHOLTZ WAS INCORRECTLY DECIDED 
This Part challenges the first prong of the Court’s holding in 
Greenholtz in two ways.  First, it argues that the holding was flawed 
because the Court ignored the similarity between parole revocation and 
parole release and therefore declined to extend the Morrissey decision to 
parole release in error.  Second, it contends that the Court incorrectly 
overlooked the similarity between parole release and judicial sentencing 
decisions. 
1. Based on the similarities between parole revocation and    
parole release, the Greenholtz holding should have been      
driven by the logic in Morrissey  
The Greenholtz Court did not extend the protections due at parole 
revocation to parole release on the basis that the two processes were 
dissimilar.106  Had the Court recognized the two processes as substantially 
similar, it would have been bound by its previous decisions in Morrissey—
which held that some due process protections apply to parole 
revocation107—and in Gagnon—which held that the right to counsel applies 
to the revocation process on a case-by-case basis.108 
The Court’s holding in Morrissey specified that because of the 
conditional liberty interest at stake, a parolee facing revocation must be 
provided with a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause, as well as 
a final hearing at which the decision of whether to revoke parole must be 
made.109  At both hearings, the Court indicated the parolee should be 
entitled to notice of the alleged violations, an opportunity to be heard in 
person, and an opportunity to present and confront witnesses.110  Finally, 
the Morrissey Court mandated that this adjudication take place in front of a 
“‘neutral and detached’ hearing body.”111 
 
106 See id. at 9. 
107 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). 
108 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). 
109 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485–89. 
110 See id. 
111 Id. 
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The Greenholtz Court should have extended similar protections to the 
parole release process, because parole revocation and parole release are 
more similar than they are distinct.  A parole revocation proceeding occurs 
when an individual who has been released on parole has allegedly violated 
the terms of his parole, either through the commission of a new crime or a 
technical violation.112  In the face of these allegations, a parolee is subject to 
proceedings to determine whether he should remain on parole or serve the 
rest of his sentence in a correctional facility.113  Simply put, a parole 
revocation decision involves tremendous discretion on the part of the 
decisionmaker.  For example, the entity reviewing a parolee’s case may 
decide that the parolee is still fit to remain in society even if a parole 
violation occurred.114 
In comparison, during the parole release process, a parole board must 
determine whether an inmate is sufficiently rehabilitated to be released into 
society.115  The core determination in each proceeding is essentially the 
same: whether, in the decisionmakers’ discretion, they believe an offender 
is fit to live freely in society based on the steps he has taken—or not 
taken—to reform his criminal ways.  In Alabama, in fact, the Alabama 
Board of Pardons and Paroles makes both parole release and revocation 
decisions.116 
Despite these substantial similarities, the Greenholtz Court found 
flawed ways to distinguish parole revocation from parole release and 
avoided extending the Morrissey protections to parole release in the 
process.  The Court distinguished the processes in two important ways: 
first, because of the incarceration status of the individuals involved,117 and 
second, because of the distinct nature of the decision at stake in each 
process.118 
The Court held that the liberty interests at stake in each process were 
fundamentally different because of the incarceration statuses of the 
individuals facing the respective hearings.119  Specifically, the Court said: 
There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally 
released before the expiration of a valid sentence.  The natural desire of an individual to be 
 
112 PETERSILIA, supra note 7, at 87. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 148. 
115 Bernhardt et al., supra note 9, at 187. 
116 2011–2012 REPORT, supra note 39, at 7. 
117 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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released is indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being confined.  But the 
conviction, with all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right.120 
The Court went on to say that because an inmate’s liberty was 
“extinguished” with his conviction, the liberty interest in parole release was 
merely an object of the inmate’s desire.121  In other words, an inmate who is 
incarcerated only “desires” to be paroled, whereas an individual living 
freely in society—i.e., an individual facing parole revocation—has a 
protectable right to remain free.  Justice Marshall criticized this argument in 
his dissent, in which he noted that such a measurement was “unrelated to 
the nature or gravity of the interest affected in parole release 
proceedings.”122  Indeed, if one removes the characterization of “desiring” 
to be free versus remaining free,123 the core interest in both cases is the 
same: freedom through an orderly and fair process. 
In addition to distinguishing the parole revocation and release 
processes based on an inmate’s incarceration status, the Greenholtz 
majority defended its doctrinal departure from Morrissey and Gagnon by 
contending that the “nature of the decision” in the parole revocation process 
is fundamentally different than in the parole release process.124  The Court 
noted that this “important difference between discretionary parole release 
from confinement and termination of parole lies in the nature of the 
decision that must be made in each case.”125  Specifically, the Court noted 
that at a parole revocation hearing, the parole board must determine two 
things: first, whether an inmate committed a violation, and second, 
“whether the parolee should be recommitted either for his or society’s 
benefit.”126  While it is arguably true that determining whether an inmate 
has committed a parole violation is a more objective determination, the 
Greenholtz majority did not address the fact that the second question posed 
by a parole revocation hearing is just as discretionary as the question at 
stake in a parole release hearing.  Both determinations require  assessing 
 
120 Id. at 7. 
121 See id. 
122 Id. at 26–27. 
123 Providing an example of the difference between the liberty interests at stake in parole 
release compared to parole revocation, the Court in Greenholtz stated that the inmate’s 
interest at a parole hearing “is no more substantial than [his] hope that he will not be 
transferred to another prison, a hope which is not protected by due process.”  Id. at 11.  
However, in Wilkinson v. Austin, the Court held that the right not to be assigned to a 
“supermax” prison facility was protected by due process.  545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005).  This 
suggests that the law defining the distinction between the object of inmates’ “desires” and 
their due process “rights” is in flux. 
124 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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whether society would be better served by the individual being free or 
incarcerated.  To characterize this core determination as anything but 
discretionary would be to ignore the meaning of the term. 
Given that the core determination in both parole revocation and parole 
release is largely the same—i.e., whether society would be better served by 
an individual’s freedom or incarceration—both processes should merit 
similar constitutional protections.  Therefore, the distinctions between 
parole revocation and parole release on which the Greenholtz Court relied 
to prevent the extension of Morrissey are ill-supported. 
2. The Greenholtz Court incorrectly concluded that a parole 
release decision is dissimilar from a judicial decision 
The Greenholtz Court erroneously held that a parole release decision 
was dissimilar from a judicial decision and that constitutional protections 
therefore afforded to the latter need not apply to the former. The Court 
concluded instead that a parole release decision was most similar to an 
Executive Branch decision, which “do[es] not automatically invoke due 
process protection.”127  The Court noted: 
In each case, the decision differs from the traditional mold of judicial decisionmaking 
in that the choice involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered 
through the experience of the decisionmaker and leading to a predictive judgment as 
to what is best both for the individual inmate and for the community.128 
The Court provided no further explanation as to why a parole release 
decision was dissimilar from a judicial decision. 
A parole release decision, however, is very similar to a judicial 
decision—particularly a judicial decision at sentencing.  The Greenholtz 
majority characterized a parole release decision as one in which the 
decisionmaker determines “what is best both for the individual inmate and 
for the community.”129  This highly discretionary decision is analogous to a 
decision made at judicial sentencing, wherein a sentencing judge is 
permitted to use “wide discretion” and encouraged to consider “any and all 
information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the 
particular defendant, given the crime committed.”130 
Additionally, the similarity between parole and sentencing decisions 
has long been recognized at the federal level.  For example, the federal 
government has two distinct methods for categorizing offenders for both 
sentencing and parole purposes, respectively called the Criminal History 
 
127 Id. at 7. 
128 Id. at 8. 
129 Id. 
130 Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984). 
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Category (CHC) and the Salient Factor Score (SFS).131  In a 2005 report by 
the United States Sentencing Commission, the Commission noted the 
overlap between the CHC and the SFS, finding that both target “the same 
underlying concepts,”132 with the primary difference being that the SFS 
assesses the likelihood of recidivism, while the CHC attempts to capture 
both recidivism and culpability.133 
Because parole release and judicial sentencing decisions are similar, it 
follows that they should enjoy similar constitutional protections.  This is not 
the case, however.  Judicial sentencing decisions invoke constitutional 
protections134 that are not applicable to parole release under Greenholtz.135  
In Gardner v. Florida, the Supreme Court held in a plurality opinion that 
the sentencing decisions must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause.136  Even though the Court has yet to recognize full due process 
protection for sentencing in a majority opinion, the sentencing process still 
enjoys a higher level of constitutional protection than does parole release.137  
Specifically, the Supreme Court has recognized that sentencing is a critical 
stage of the criminal process at which assistance of counsel is required.138  
Additionally, according to the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 
standards for sentencing hearings, “[S]entencing proceedings should be 
conducted openly and formally with due regard for the essential elements of 
due process in our adversary system of justice.”139  The ABA standards go 
on to specify a right to counsel and a right of allocution—or a right to be 
heard—for the defendant.140 
In addition to the similarity between the sentencing and parole release 
processes, evidence also suggests that sentencing judges consider the 
possibility of parole release when issuing sentences.  In the recent case of 
Reiger v. State, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland considered 
whether it was proper for a sentencing judge to consider parole in issuing an 
 
131 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY AND THE U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION SALIENT 
FACTOR SCORE 1, 4 (2005). 
132 Id. at 6. 
133 See id. at 1–2. 
134 See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 
(1967) (holding that individuals should be afforded a lawyer at probation proceedings in 
which a judicial sentence is issued). 
135 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). 
136 See Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358. 
137 See id.; Mempa, 389 U.S. at 137. 
138 Mempa, 389 U.S. at 137. 
139 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING, Standard 18-5.17 (3d ed. 
1994) [hereinafter ABA SENTENCING STANDARDS]. 
140 See id. 
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offender’s sentence.141  The court held that such consideration was proper, 
noting that “[a] defendant’s parole eligibility date is relevant, without 
regard to whether parole will ever be granted, because it allows the court to 
determine the defendant’s minimum period of incarceration.”142  The court 
continued: “Assessing what length of time a defendant should be 
incarcerated for the crime he committed lies at the very heart of the court’s 
constitutional duty to sentence.”143  Other state and federal courts have also 
recognized interdependence between the sentencing and parole release 
processes.144 
The reality that sentencing judges regularly consider parole release 
when determining appropriate sentences for offenders is critical for 
determining whether a liberty interest exists at the parole release stage.  The 
Greenholtz Court overlooked this consideration by routinely characterizing 
parole release as the object of an inmate’s “desire” rather than something 
that could be reasonably expected. However, since sentencing judges 
consider parole release when issuing sentences, it follows that judges and 
inmates see the possibility of parole release not as an added benefit that the 
inmate “desires,” but rather as part of the offenders’ sentences and a process 
they expect to comport with fairness.145 
Given the close connection between sentencing and parole release, the 
constitutional protections required at sentencing should also apply to parole 
release.  While this may mean that parole release is not given the full force 
of due process protection, the Alabama practice of excluding inmates from 
parole release hearings would still be unconstitutional, as this Comment 
discusses more fully in Part III.C. 
B. THE SECOND PRONG OF GREENHOLTZ IS MISGUIDED UNDER SANDIN 
V. CONNER 
The second prong of Greenholtz held that a liberty interest in a parole 
hearing could be conferred by state statute, depending on the statute’s 
 
141 Reiger v. State, 908 A.2d 124, 125 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006). 
142 Id. at 130. 
143 Id. 
144 See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 240 n.8 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that “[s]entencing 
judges also consider parole practices before setting a term of confinement”); State v. 
Scherzer, 694 A.2d 196, 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding that it is appropriate 
for a sentencing judge to consider the parole consequences of a sentence); State v. Lohnes, 
344 N.W.2d 686, 689 (S.D. 1984) (restating that it is permissible for a sentencing judge to 
consider parole eligibility in sentencing). 
145 The dissenting Justices in Greenholtz raised a similar argument.  Greenholtz v. 
Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 30 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting in 
part). 
2013] THE IRON CURTAIN 1221 
language.146  While the Greenholtz Court held that the Nebraska statute 
conferred such an interest, other federal courts have reached the opposite 
conclusion with respect to state parole statutes.147  Concerning Alabama’s 
parole statute, the Eleventh Circuit held just a few years after Greenholtz 
that the Alabama parole statute did not confer a liberty interest during the 
parole release process.148  This means that there is no requirement of 
“orderly process”149 simply because the state has provided for the 
possibility of discretionary parole release.  In essence, the state of Alabama 
can provide for the opportunity for parole release by statute yet fashion the 
process to obtain such release in any way it sees fit.  Under this reading of 
Greenholtz, the state of Alabama could provide for the possibility of parole 
release, and as long as the statute did not confer a liberty interest on the 
process, the state could allow the Board to flip a coin in making its 
decisions about whom to reject or release. 
When one considers the difference between the Alabama statute, 
which the Eleventh Circuit held did not create a liberty interest in parole,150 
and the Nebraska statute, which the Supreme Court held did confer a liberty 
interest,151 it is easy to see the semantic distinction between the two.  The 
Nebraska statute at issue in Greenholtz reads: “Whenever the Board of 
Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for 
release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his 
release should be deferred.”152  The most important statutory language in 
the Nebraska statute, in the eyes of the Greenholtz Court, was that the board 
“shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be 
deferred.”153  In contrast, the Alabama parole statute states that a prisoner 
may be released “only if the Board of Pardons and Paroles is of the opinion 
 
146 Id. at 12. 
147 See Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding no liberty interest in 
revised Missouri parole statute); Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653, 656–57 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(finding no liberty interest in Arkansas parole statute); Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215, 
1217–18 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the Mississippi parole statute does not create a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest during the parole release process); Williams v. 
Briscoe, 641 F.2d 274, 276–77 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 854 (1981) (finding no 
liberty interest under Texas parole statute); Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir. 
1979) (finding no liberty interest in Ohio parole statute). 
148 Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 489 (11th Cir. 1982).  But see Ellard v. Alabama Bd. 
of Pardons & Paroles, 824 F.2d 937, 944–45 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Alabama Parole 
Board’s grant of parole to an inmate created a constitutionally protected liberty interest). 
149 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). 
150 Sellers, 691 F.2d at 489. 
151 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12. 
152 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-1, 114(1) (West 1976). 
153 Id. (emphasis added). 
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that there is reasonable probability that if such prisoner is released, he will 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is 
not incompatible with the welfare of society.”154 
Thus, the most significant difference between these two statutes is that 
the Nebraska statute mandates that parole be granted “unless” certain 
conditions are met, whereas the Alabama statute reads that parole will be 
granted “only if” certain conditions are satisfied.  The Greenholtz Court 
examined the words in the Nebraska statute carefully and determined that 
they created a “statutory expectation” of parole and therefore warranted due 
process protection.155 
This semantically focused approach, however, does not necessarily 
align with the Court’s reasoning in Sandin, which shifts the focus of a due 
process analysis from the mandatory language of a statute or regulation to 
an assessment of the potential deprivation of liberty at stake.156  In Sandin, a 
Hawaii inmate challenged the procedures relating to the imposition of 
correctional segregation as a disciplinary action for misconduct.157  In 
reaching a decision on whether the procedures comported with due process, 
the Sandin Court discussed the aftermath of Greenholtz, stating that 
following Greenholtz, the Court “ceased to examine the ‘nature’ of the 
interest with respect to interests allegedly created by the State.”158  The 
Sandin Court went on to say that one of the undesirable effects of this 
approach was that “[s]tates may avoid creation of ‘liberty’ interests by 
having scarcely any regulations, or by conferring standardless discretion on 
correctional personnel.”159  The Court further held that the proper analysis 
was to look at the “nature of the deprivation,” rather than “the language of a 
particular regulation.”160  In other words, the Sandin decision challenges the 
Court’s previous conception of what warrants close examination for the 
purposes of relying on the wording of a statute or regulation to dictate 
whether a liberty interest exists. 
Applying the reasoning in Sandin to the facts of Greenholtz, the Court 
today would likely focus on the “nature of the deprivation” at a parole 
release hearing rather than on whether the language of the particular parole 
statute was sufficiently mandatory.  The “nature of the deprivation” at stake 
in a parole release hearing is as follows: if an inmate is denied release, he is 
 
154 ALA. CODE § 15-22-26 (West 1975) (emphasis added). 
155 See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12–14. 
156 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995). 
157 Id. at 475–76. 
158 Id. at 480. 
159 Id. at 482. 
160 Id. at 481. 
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denied freedom from incarceration.  Therefore, if his rights are violated 
during the release process, such a violation has an enormous impact on his 
freedom.  Given the nature of this liberty and the effect of its deprivation, if 
the Court were to reconsider Greenholtz, it would likely reach a different 
decision about the presence of a liberty interest during the parole release 
process.  Thus, the second prong of Greenholtz, with its rigid focus on the 
language of the Nebraska parole statute, represents an outdated due process 
analysis and should be abandoned accordingly. 
C. ASSUMING A PROTECTED LIBERTY INTEREST EXISTS AT PAROLE 
RELEASE, ALABAMA’S POLICY OF INMATE EXCLUSION IS A 
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS 
If the holding pertaining to parole release in Greenholtz was 
overturned, as this Comment advocates, Alabama’s practice of inmate 
exclusion from parole release hearings before the Board is a violation of 
due process. 
1. Inmate presence at parole release hearings matters 
Inmates should be present at their own parole release hearings.  The 
need for an inmate to be present at his parole release hearing can be 
illustrated through the following three situations, all of which describe true 
events.161 
In the fall of 2010, an advocate for an inmate appeared before the 
Board.  At the time of the hearing, the inmate was serving a life sentence 
for a nonviolent offense, yet he was not permitted to attend his own parole 
hearing due to the Board’s policies.  He suffered from an illness that was, in 
all likelihood, fatal.  During the hearing, the Board especially focused on 
discussing the inmate’s medical prognosis.  Unable to examine or obtain the 
inmate’s medical records, the advocate admitted that she did not know the 
inmate’s precise prognosis and current condition.  If the inmate himself had 
been able to attend, he could likely have answered the Board’s questions 
about his health more accurately.  He could have served as his own 
advocate on his journey to be free from incarceration.  
In the spring of 2011, the same advocate appeared before the Board on 
behalf of an inmate who was also serving a life sentence.  Having served 
ten years of her sentence, the inmate sought a grant of discretionary parole.  
The Board had previously denied the inmate parole three years before.  
 
161 These scenarios are based on the personal experiences of the author through her work 
advocating on behalf of Alabama inmates during their parole release hearings.  The author 
advocated on behalf of four inmates over the course of one year.  Certain facts have been 
omitted or altered to protect the anonymity of the individuals involved. 
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During the hearing, the advocate pleaded with the Board on behalf of the 
absent inmate to consider all of the steps the inmate had taken to 
rehabilitate herself during her incarceration.  Despite repeatedly expressing 
concern about the inmate’s potential for reoffending, the Board granted the 
inmate release.  Given its strong expression of concern about releasing the 
inmate, it is unclear whether the Board would have reached the same 
decision had no advocate been present.   
About a month later, the advocate returned to the Board on behalf of 
an inmate who had served nearly his entire sentence for a crime that he 
maintains he did not commit.  He was actively involved in many prison 
programs and even had the support of prison employees for his release.  
The advocate urged the Board to consider the inmate’s advanced age and 
deteriorating health, which the advocate asserted made him less likely to 
reoffend.  Without inquiring further about the inmate’s health and without 
seeing the inmate’s visible frailties in person, however, the Board denied 
the inmate parole.  This scenario begs the question: Would the Board have 
considered the health of the inmate to a greater degree had the inmate 
himself been present at the hearing? 
The fact that inmates’ presence might affect parole release hearing 
outcomes is not only demonstrated through these situations but was also 
confirmed in a recent study.  This study, led by Richard Tewksbury and 
David Patrick Connor, found that inmates participating in parole 
hearings face-to-face with parole officials “were more likely to receive a 
parole recommendation.”162  Additionally, the study found that inmates 
participating in video parole hearings “were less likely to receive a parole 
recommendation.”163  The researchers hypothesized that this disparity could 
be explained, because “hearings conducted through video conferencing 
have less intimate interactions, resulting in reduced exchanges of 
information and decreased interpersonal connections.”164  While Tewksbury 
and Connor did not specifically study or compare the outcomes of hearings 
in which the inmate was absent entirely, the fact that they found a 
significant change in outcomes based simply on whether the inmate was 
present physically as opposed to appearing via videoconference is a good 
indicator of what research may show in the former scenario.  It seems that 
the results of “less intimate interactions” and “decreased interpersonal 
connections” would be exacerbated further in a situation in which the 
inmate could not appear before the Board at all. 
 
162 Tewksbury & Connor, supra note 61, at 56. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
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 The researchers’ conclusions are not surprising.  Other studies 
involving videoconferencing indicate such communication can be vastly 
different than face-to-face communication.   In a recent study examining the 
effects of various media interactions on “team trust,” researchers noted that: 
[F]ace-to-face is the richest media because non-verbal cues and information regarding 
the social context are available during the process of communication. . . .  
[V]ideoconference is not as rich as face-to-face due to technological constraints, such 
as lack of synchronization between vision and sound, difficulty in making eye contact, 
fewer non-verbal cues than face-to-face . . . .165 
 Furthermore, it is well accepted that “greater parole board discretion 
makes additional information more valuable.”166  By excluding an inmate 
from his parole hearing, the Board does nothing but perpetuate the “reduced 
exchanges of information” described by Tewksbury and Connor as 
significant contributors to the outcome of the process.  If greater 
information leads to a more informed decision on the part of the Board, 
then it seems detrimental to eliminate a source of information that is 
extremely relevant to the ultimate outcome: the inmate himself. 
The fact that inmate presence at a parole release hearing is likely to 
have an effect on that hearing’s outcome only strengthens the argument that 
the nature of the liberty at stake in a parole release hearing and the potential 
for its deprivation is sufficient to warrant due process protection by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
2. Supreme Court, federal, and state case law support the 
contention that when a liberty interest exists during               
parole release, preventing an inmate from attending his           
parole release hearing is a violation of due process 
When the Greenholtz Court decided that the Nebraska statute 
conferred a liberty interest in parole release, the Court then analyzed the 
processes of the Nebraska Board of Parole to determine whether these 
procedures met due process demands.167  In finding that these processes 
comported with due process, the Court noted that “[a]t the Board’s initial 
interview hearing, the inmate is permitted to appear before the Board and 
present letters and statements on his own behalf.”168  The Court went on to 
say that “[t]he Nebraska procedure affords an opportunity to be heard, and 
when parole is denied it informs the inmate in what respects he falls short 
 
165 Vicente Peñarroja et al., The Effects of Virtuality Level on Task-Related Collaborative 
Behaviors: The Mediating Role of Team Trust, 29 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 967, 968 (2013). 
166 Bernhardt et al., supra note 9, at 186. 
167 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). 
168 Id. at 15. 
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of qualifying for parole; this affords the process that is due under these 
circumstances.  The Constitution does not require more.”169 
The key part of the Court’s opinion is the recognized importance of the 
inmate appearing physically before the Board and having an opportunity to 
“be heard.”170  Other state and federal courts have also found inmate 
presence at parole release hearings to be a significant factor in determining 
whether parole release procedures satisfy due process.  In Sage v. Gamble, 
the Montana Supreme Court specifically held that an inmate who was 
denied the opportunity to appear personally at his parole hearing was denied 
due process.171  Relying on the Greenholtz Court’s treatment of an inmate’s 
right to appear, the Montana Supreme Court concluded:  
While it is true that the Court in Greenholtz did not directly address the issue of 
whether due process requires an opportunity to personally appear before the Board, its 
approval of the procedure provided in Nebraska was couched almost exclusively in 
terms of the parole applicant’s opportunity to personally appear.172 
Similarly, in Newbury v. Prisoner Review Board, the Seventh Circuit 
considered whether due process required all three Prisoner Review Board 
(PRB) members to be present for an inmate’s parole hearing.173  In 
concluding that it was not a violation of due process to allow just one PRB 
member to be present for the hearing, the court concluded: 
The Review Board’s procedure for providing the inmate with the opportunity to appear 
personally before at least one member of the panel of the Review Board to insure that 
the  Board is considering his records and to present any special considerations 
demonstrating why he is an appropriate candidate for parole satisfies the requirements of 
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.174 
Like the U.S. Supreme Court and the Montana Supreme Court, the 
Seventh Circuit also noted that the opportunity to appear personally before 
a member of the parole board was a significant part of the equation for 
determining whether due process rights were satisfied during the parole 
release process.175  Given the importance of inmate presence demonstrated 
by social science research, as well as the prominence of the issue in both 
state and federal cases concerning parole release decisions, a policy that 
effectively excludes an inmate from the parole release process altogether 
should be seriously questioned.  In short, if due process applies to the 
 
169 Id. at 16. 
170 Id. at 15–16. 
171 Sage v. Gamble, 929 P.2d 822, 827 (Mont. 1996). 
172 Id. at 825. 
173 See Newbury v. Prisoner Review Bd., 791 F.2d 81, 87 (7th Cir. 1986). 
174 Id. 
175 See id. 
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procedures of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles—which prior 
discussion indicates it should—then the Board’s unofficial policy of inmate 
exclusion is unconstitutional and impermissible. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles operates today, inmates 
facing the parole release process have no opportunity to truly be heard by 
the group of people deciding their fate.176  This is because the Board 
perpetuates a practice of prohibiting inmates from attending these hearings.  
The 1979 Supreme Court decision in Greenholtz allows such policies to 
exist by holding that inmates do not enjoy any constitutionally conferred 
due process protections during parole release hearings.177  This decision 
represented a break with precedent—Morrissey and Gagnon—and was 
based on then-flawed and now-outdated reasoning after Sandin in 1995.  If 
the Supreme Court overturns Greenholtz and decides that the Fourteenth 
Amendment confers some amount of due process protection to parole 
release decisions, as this Comment posits, then the policy of excluding 
Alabama inmates from their own parole hearings would violate the 
excluded inmates’ due process rights. 
Finding such exclusion to be unconstitutional would certainly frustrate 
Alabama’s current system of holding all parole hearings in Montgomery 
while refusing to transport inmates from their individual facilities.  But the 
state might consider a number of solutions.  One possible solution to the 
problem is to have the Alabama Department of Corrections agree to pay for 
the inmates’ transportation.  This solution would likely be met with a fair 
amount of resistance, as Board representatives have noted that “[t]o 
transport inmates to the Board for their parole hearing would create an 
added financial responsibility for the Department of Corrections.”178  
Another potential solution is to return to a system under which parole 
hearings were held at the individual facilities, allowing the inmates a chance 
to attend the hearings without having to pay for their transportation to 
another city.179  Such a shift would, however, admittedly require an 
overhaul of the institutional process to which the Board has grown 
accustomed.  Still another solution would be to allow inmates to at least 
 
176 ALA. CODE § 15-22 (West 1975) (providing no right for an inmate to appear in person 
at his or her parole release hearing). 
177 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). 
178 July 2013 Board Letter, supra note 12. 
179 Board representatives have alluded to this prior system, although it is unclear when 
Montgomery became the exclusive site for parole hearings.  See November 2012 Board E-
mail, supra note 12. 
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appear before the Board via videoconference—an opportunity that a 
number of states provide in lieu of allowing the inmate to appear in 
person.180 
There are, indeed, alternatives to the current practice of excluding 
inmates from attending their own parole release hearings in Alabama, 
notwithstanding the logistical changes that may be necessary to execute 
these alternatives.  Just as there is no “iron curtain drawn between the 
Constitution and the prisons of this country,”181 neither should one be 
drawn between inmates and a state-provided opportunity to be free from the 
confinement of prison. 
 
 
180 See Tewksbury and Connor, supra note 61, at 56 (referencing the difference in 
outcomes between inmates who appeared before the Board via videoconference and those 
that appeared before the board physically); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3717(j)(1) (West 
2007) (“Before ordering the parole of any inmate, the prisoner review board shall have the 
inmate appear either in person or via a video conferencing format and shall interview the 
inmate unless impractical because of the inmate’s physical or mental condition or absence 
from the institution.”); Parole Hearings via Video, ARK. PAROLE BOARD, http://paroleboard.
arkansas.gov/MeetingInfo/Pages/VideoHearings.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2013) (indicating 
that “[w]hile the Board will normally conduct hearings in person, there may be 
circumstances where the use of video conferencing is appropriate and/or necessary to 
facilitate an effective and efficient hearing”); NEV. BOARD OF PAROLE COMMISSIONERS, 
http://www.parole.nv.gov/node/1 (last visited Aug. 20, 2013) (“Parole hearings are 
conducted via video conference from the offices of the Parole Board to the institution where 
the inmate is housed.”). 
181 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974). 
